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Abstract 
 
Classical theory suggests that economies operate efficiently when agents 
have open and symmetric access to market information such as the price, quality, 
and availability of goods and services. Emerging economies often lack the infra-
structure and institutional framework necessary to facilitate this fluid transmission 
of information, and are subsequently defined by informational divides that sustain 
systemic structural impediments to development.   The recent proliferation of mo-
bile telephone services in the developing world, however, has created new possi-
bilities for information-sharing among the globe’s poorest populations, and has 
introduced the potential for development that is both economically sustainable 
and inherently “bottom up.” 
This paper considers the role of mobile telephony for development 
through an empirical examination of agricultural markets in one of the world’s 
poorest countries—Mozambique.  Using established methods of analysis in con-
junction with a novel geospatial approach, we find that while the introduction of 
cellular technology has a discernible impact on agricultural price behavior in our 
sample, overall the estimated effect of mobiles falls short of our expectations.   
This study therefore draws upon an alternative theory on price dispersion and 
connects it with the current empirical research on mobiles phones for develop-
ment.  In total, we conclude that while mobiles are an influential force in Mozam-
bique’s staple food markets, additional constraints such as trade discontinuities 
between markets are the primary source of persistent price dispersion and ineffi-
ciency.     
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Introduction 
  
Since the introduction of cell phones nearly two decades ago, mobile telephony has experienced 
near exponential growth and widespread adoption throughout the world.  Living in the United States, we 
observe on a daily basis the impact that mobiles have on our lives—the ability to call friends, coordinate 
with colleagues, and access the seemingly infinite volume of information available on the Internet has 
become integrated into our normal routines.  A recent survey by the Pew Research Center now indicates 8 
out of every 10 adults in the United States owns a cell phone, and furthermore that 49% of Americans 
consider their mobile phone to be a “necessity” rather than a luxury—a truly remarkable achievement for 
a device that didn’t exist just a few decades ago (Taylor et al. 2009). As mobile technologies are further 
refined and usage becomes even more prevalent, the importance of the cell phone will only continue to 
build as economies become increasingly technology oriented.   
This widespread adoption of mobile technology is not confined to the world’s wealthier nations.  
Figure 1, for instance, vividly illustrates the incredible phenomenon seen throughout the previous decade 
whereby developing nations are absorbing mobile technology on an unprecedented and exponential scale.   
 
Figure 1. Source ITU 2011. 
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Figure 2. Source ITU 2010. 
What is truly remarkable, however, is how robust this growth is even in regions where the aver-
age per capita income is just a small fraction of that of more developed nations.  This phenomenon  is in-
deed striking and points to the fact that the potential gains associated with cell phone use are large enough 
to warrant investment by some of the world’s poorest populations.   
 
Figure 3. Source ITU 2010. 
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els of demand for mobiles phones, and through what channels—if any—are these new technologies re-
shaping the social, political, cultural, and economic landscapes of the developing world? 
These questions form the central focus of the current study.  As the digital age continues to 
evolve and information & communications technology (ICT) becomes more entrenched in the global 
economy, the role of ICT—and specifically mobile ICT—will become a progressively more important 
aspect of future development strategies.  Indeed as teledensity increases in the developing world, the im-
pact these devices have on economic outcomes will become increasingly pronounced, and the overall 
shift from “luxury” to “necessity” will be realized. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section I outlines a review of the relevant litera-
ture, and draws broadly from previous studies on market theory, network economics, consumer search 
theory, and development economics.  Section II provides background information on Mozambique, and 
likewise provides a description of the data and our empirical strategy.  Section III presents the structure 
and findings of our empirical analysis, and Section IV concludes.  Additional information can be found 
within the appendices as cited within the text.  
 
Section I—Review of the Literature      
  
 
The field of development economics, whether implicitly or explicitly, centers on growth 
theory.   That is, understanding how markets develop, what factors hinder or enable that devel-
opment, and what conditions, if any, will lead to a convergence among economies.  While the 
exact nature of growth theory is hotly disputed, all models currently debated within the litera-
ture—be it classical specifications or the more contemporary endogenous growth models—agree 
on the necessity of “technological change” as a determinant of long-run economic growth.   
10 
 
Macroeconomic growth theory, however, frequently takes a “black box” approach to 
technological change, and often treats all efficiency-enhancing technologies, at least at an ab-
stract level, as equal.  Indeed, with a few notable exceptions,
 1
  growth theory does not richly dis-
cuss the specific components of technological change, but rather considers innovation in more 
generalist terms. While this may suffice when conducting large cross-country studies on eco-
nomic development, it fails to provide pragmatic solutions for how technology can be harnessed 
to address issues of underdevelopment in the third world.   
 As such, the primary interest of this paper—and indeed the central research question of 
this study—is understanding how one particular technology—mobile phones—can impact mar-
ket outcomes in emerging economies.    The current literature regarding mobile telephony in the 
developing world is immense, drawing from multiple disciplines including anthropology, politi-
cal science, sociology, as well as economics.  While these perspectives are undoubtedly im-
portant for understanding the role of mobile phones across a range of cultures and political sys-
tems, the current study is limited to the areas of the literature that most directly address the quan-
titative aspect of the research question.  These areas include classical market theory in the con-
text of LDCs, theoretical studies on information and transaction costs in emerging markets and 
the subsequent role of telecommunications, and conclude with micro-econometric studies that 
measure the impact of mobile telephony on the markets in question.   
It should be noted, however, that the omitted areas of the literature mentioned above offer 
an invaluable perspective on mobile telephones as an economic, social, and cultural phenomenon. 
This paper does not reject this complementary research, rather we maintain a quantitative focus 
                                                     
1
 Several studies do make attempts to model the nature of technological change.  Basu and Weil (1996), for in-
stance posit that technologies differ according to their “capital intensity” and hence diffusion of new innovation 
will be a function of its applicability to a particular economy while other work, for example Foster and Rosenzweig 
(1996) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) show that education has positive impacts on output growth.  The lit-
erature regarding specific technological interventions, however, remains sparse. 
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that is consistent with the spirit of economic analysis, and remain fully cognizant that mobile 
phones have additional consequences—both positive and negative—for other areas of daily life.     
The Problem 
 In a basic theoretical sense, a market functions as a massive coordination system that 
generates “efficient” allocations of goods and services based upon the supply and demand condi-
tions communicated through price behavior (Eggleston, Jensen, and Zeckhauser 2002; R Jensen 
2007, 2-4).   Indeed classical market theory stipulates the conditions necessary for this process—
seminal work by Stigler (1961) and Akerloff (1970), for example, stress the importance of low-
cost and “perfect information,” while work by Stigliz (1979) espouses the “law of one price” as 
essential for generating efficient outcomes.   
Shifting to the context of developing economies, emerging markets are typically charac-
terized by conditions and institutions that run counter to these classical assumptions.  Foremost 
of these are that LDCs often lack basic infrastructure—low telephone hardline penetration rates 
and inadequate roadways and public transportation often mean that travel is expensive, time con-
suming, and potentially dangerous, while at the same time the costs of accessing broader markets 
are prohibitively high for many individuals (see, for example, Eggleston (2002), Aker (2008 & 
2010), Aker and Mbiti (2010), Overa (2006), and others).  In an early cross-discipline study, 
Geertz (1979) finds that information shortages in rural village markets cause participants to de-
vote a large amount of time and effort towards building and maintaining insular trade circles, and 
likewise result in the emergence of “clientelization.”  More current studies find similar trends 
among developing nations—Overa (2006) for example, finds that information asymmetries in 
Ghanaian cloth markets cause transaction costs to increase dramatically, forcing traders to rely 
on extra-market institutions such as trade cooperatives or intermediaries which inhibit access to 
12 
 
broader markets.  Similarly, Jagun, Heeks, & Whalley (2008) find that informational challenges 
“reduce the chances that business and trade will emerge…keep supply chains localized and in-
termediated…[and] make trade within those supply chains slow, costly, and risky.”   
The current state of emerging economies in turn generates outcomes that are in conflict 
with the basic market tenets outlined above—Aker (2008 and 2010), Badiane & Shively (1998), 
Jensen (2007), and Eggleston et al. (2002), for example, find that price dispersion for homoge-
nous goods is higher in markets that lack telecommunications infrastructure (i.e. where infor-
mation is costly), a phenomenon that is in direct violation of the “law of one price.”  Further the-
oretical study, for example by North (1995), postulates that the persistence of market failures and 
externalities will in turn force institutions to emerge that allow economic activity to take place 
despite these failures.  Thus these patterns of localization, “clientelization,” and intermediaries 
will continue to form in the void created by market failures, and the negative outcomes they pro-
duce will remain persistent. 
 While the issues that plague developing economies are as diverse as their respective so-
cial, cultural, and geographical underpinnings, the evidence is clear that information failures are 
pervasive in LDCs worldwide.  When one considers both the importance of information for 
proper market function as well as the current state of LDCs, the disparity that exists becomes 
clear and points to the need for an intervention that can directly address these information gaps.  
Why Cell Phones? 
 The potential of telecommunications for development has attracted considerable attention 
by economists.  Early work by Leff (1984), for instance, shows that the introduction of telecom-
munications to developing countries “sharply reduces the costs of transmitting information over 
space and time” allowing for more optimal organizational structures to emerge (p.257).  This im-
13 
 
proved availability of information in turn creates a ripple effect throughout the entire economy—
both Leff (1984) and Norton (1992), for instance, show that lowering transaction costs through 
enhanced telecommunications infrastructure has the external effect of “making other institutions 
more efficient,” thus promoting overall economic welfare.  Norton (1992) builds upon Leff by 
finding empirical evidence that “low telecommunications infrastructure is one reason why some 
parts of the world have not developed,” and posits that the positive externalities associated with 
increased communications technology have gone unrecognized, arguing further that ICT should 
be considered a primary policy tool going forward. 
 As technology advanced from landline- to mobile-based telephony, the value of cell 
phones to developing nations solidified.  Empirical studies, for example by Waverman et al. 
(2001), Torero et al. (2003), Aker (2008 & 2010), Aker & Mbiti (2010), Must et al., and others, 
find that not only does increased mobile phone penetration lower transaction and search related 
costs, but the portability of cellular phones carries with it the added benefit of increasing the ve-
locity with which information can be exchanged.  These studies show that the theoretical basis 
for telecommunications technology is indeed valid when subjected to further empirical scrutiny, 
and that the shift from landline to mobile technologies further reduces transaction costs and in-
creases the volume of and demand for information. 
 While the above discussion enforces the theoretical basis of mobile phones for develop-
ment strategies, there are several other considerations that reinforce these findings.  Research by 
Waverman et al. (2001), Chiu et al. (2008), as well as several policy papers by wireless carriers 
(see, for example, Vodafone 2005)  shows that the relatively low costs associated with mobile 
phone rollout make implementation an obtainable development goal.   Furthermore, the decen-
tralized nature of cell phones promotes development that is inherently “bottom up.” In his narra-
14 
 
tive on mobile telephony in Bangladesh, Sullivan (2007), for example, recounts how cell phones 
are empowering the poor—especially women—to engage in market activity that was previously 
unavailable to them.  This potential for “bottom up,” decentralized, private-sector development 
has in turn attracted the attention of policy arenas worldwide, whereby government organizations 
are beginning to look seriously at mobile telephony as a component of their respective develop-
ment strategies (see, for example, Pedrelli 2001). 
 While current research has shown how mobile telephony will reshape the dynamics of 
search and transaction costs, a separate strand of literature focuses on how the near exponential 
increase in cell phone adoption has spawned additional mobile applications that generate positive 
externalities on their respective markets.  Baliamoune-Lutz (2003) for instance, shows that more 
cell phone subscriptions within a country correspond to higher levels of political freedom and 
agency, while Sullivan (2007) finds that increased access to information creates new job oppor-
tunities and higher wage potentials.  In addition, mobile applications are now introducing new 
possibilities for developing economies—organizations such as Satellife use mobile phones to 
track rural healthcare issues, while Aker & Mbiti (2010) discuss programs that enforce literacy 
through SMS messaging.  The most intriguing new program to emerge from mobile technology, 
however, comes in the form of mobile banking.  Studies by Jack & Suri (2011), Hughes and 
Susie (2007), Must & Ludwieg (2010), as well as several Vodafone policy papers comment on 
this phenomenon, whereby the ability to transfer money via SMS messaging (such as with the 
M-PESA program in Kenya) is streamlining transactions and  extending banking services to 
populations that were previously without access to formal financial institutions. 
 The literature in the previous section outlines the structural problems that exist in devel-
oping markets due to information gaps, and finds that costly information in turn inhibits the effi-
15 
 
cient functioning of market systems.  In response, there has been an emerging field of research 
on the use of mobile telephony to combat issues of information gaps in the developing world.   
While an analysis of cell phones is admittedly a narrow subject within the broad realm of 
development policies, the classical theory on the importance of information, along with the find-
ings put forth by current studies on the mobile phone usage, suggest that mobile phones will be 
an integral part of the development process going forward, and is worthy of in-depth analysis.  
Furthermore, mobile telephony is shown to have additional considerations that make it an intri-
guing and viable instrument for development policies.  That is, while low fixed-costs of imple-
mentation and interest from private sector providers make mobile telephony feasible, the de-
creased transaction costs and increased access to information, the “bottom-up” nature of devel-
opment, and the spillover effects generated by increased access to information make mobile te-
lephony appealing from both a development and policy standpoint. 
 
This study builds upon the current microeconomic literature by employing a quantitative 
analysis of agricultural price behavior in one of the world’s poorest countries, Mozambique.  In-
deed the intuition and anecdotal evidence outlined above motivates the idea that cell phones will 
lower price dispersion and enhance market efficiency.  Performing an analysis of a specific mar-
ket in turn allows us to exploit the rich nature of comprehensive microeconomic data sets and 
produce estimates that are more accurate and informative than similarly-aimed cross-country 
analyses.  
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Section II—Background Information and Data 
 
In practical terms, the expansion of mobile networks in the developing world has meant 
the introduction of a new and disruptive form of communication technology to end users.  When 
we attempt to quantify the potential benefits of mobile usage, the underlying phenomenon we are 
in fact measuring is the impact of increased access to information—be it through closer connec-
tions with family or colleagues, knowledge of the price and availability of certain goods, or oth-
erwise—on consumer behavior and market efficiency.   
Given the informational component of mobile phones discussed above, a natural basis for 
an empirical strategy comes from the vast literature on consumer search theory.  In his seminal 
research on the importance of information, Stigler suggests that “Price dispersion is a manifesta-
tion- and, indeed, it is the measure of—ignorance in the market,” (Stigler 1961 p.214), whereby 
he acknowledges that price dispersions (i.e. a deviation from the LOP) emerge due to the exist-
ence of search costs to buyers and sellers for goods.  He further posits that “…the optimum 
amount of search will be such that the marginal cost of search equals the expected increase in 
receipts” (Stigler 1961 p.216).   The introduction of a new search technology that significantly 
reduces the marginal costs of search therefore holds theoretical promise. 
As we consider the case of developing agricultural markets, the importance of search 
costs becomes even more acute.  If, for example, price information travels by person (in the ab-
sence of radio, telephone, or other form of ICT), then the cost of search may be prohibitively 
high.  In the extreme case, consider a  farmer who needs to walk to a marketplace or resale loca-
tion in order to obtain information on prices—in such a scenario, the farmer is unlikely to engage 
in much search, and will likely be forced to blindly choose both a day and a marketplace in 
which to sell his or her goods.  The result of such high search costs will in turn yield market-
17 
 
placees that are geographically segmented, and create persistent violations to the “law of one 
price.” 
Contemporary search-theoretic models apply a similar logic to developing agricultural 
economies.  Using Nigerien grain traders as an example, Aker (2008) proposes that decreases in 
search cost will a) increase the overall number of marketplaces a trader will search, b) increase 
the reservation price among traders, and c) will reduce the variation in prices across market-
placees. While the theoretical model provides a more rigorous framework, the intuition she pre-
sents is straightforward—as the marginal cost of search decreases to farmers and traders, they are 
in turn better able to seek out the best prices for their goods across both space and time.  This 
phenomenon has immense welfare implications, as the overall level of price dispersion should 
decrease as well as bring stability to prices across all marketplaces.   
The current study employs the search-theoretic models outlined by Aker (2008) in an at-
tempt to quantify the impact of mobile phones in a developing-economy setting. The subsequent 
analysis operationalizes the theoretical model by observing and analyzing the impact of mobile 
networks in Mozambique’s market for Common Beans, a staple crop.  Specifically, the strategy 
employed hypothesizes that the emergence of mobile phones will coordinately increase the in-
formational flows among farmers and traders, a phenomenon which will become empirically vis-
ible through a reduction in the dispersion of prices among the country’s dispersed agricultural 
marketplaces.    
Mozambique Background          
Any successful empirical investigation must be based on a model that is intuitive and rel-
evant to the subject in question.  The necessary first step of the current study is therefore to iden-
tify the character of Mozambique’s agricultural markets, build an understanding of how these 
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markets function and how the individuals within behave, and then consider how an intervention 
such as mobile telephony might perform within that space.  The current realities we observe in 
Mozambique are then placed within the context of classical market theory to identify any dis-
crepancies that exist between the two.  From this point it is then possible to identify the channels 
through which mobile phones might remedy persistent market failures and construct more mean-
ingful empirical models. 
Overview 
Located in sub-Saharan Africa along the Indian ocean, Mozambique remains quantita-
tively one of the poorest nations in the world, with a per capita income of just $372.04 and a 
ranking of 184 on the Human Development Index (out of 187) (World Bank 2011).  Historical 
circumstances and political uncertainty have coordinately played a detrimental role in fostering 
economic and social development, however political stability in recent decades has generated 
positive trends throughout the country.  
The current landscape of Mozambique is in large part defined by its former status as a co-
lonial state of Portugal.  As early as the turn of the 16
th
 century, Portuguese traders had estab-
lished a presence in areas along the northern coast and up the Zambezi River, and subsequently 
continued to establish dominance throughout the following centuries.  By the early 1900s, the 
Portuguese had created a firmly established colonial power and exercised absolute authority 
throughout the territory. 
As was typically the case throughout European colonies in Africa, the Portuguese imple-
mented extractive and detrimental institutions aimed at promoting European interests—labor 
laws reserved skilled jobs for Portuguese colonists, while access to education was mostly denied 
to native Mozambicans.  Furthermore, the Portuguese placed little emphasis on investing 
19 
 
 
      Figure 4.  
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in social or physical infrastructure that would aid the domestic economy, and instead built trans-
portation lines that promoted economically lucrative industries such as mining and trade with 
Mozambique’s inland neighbors. 
Widespread support for independence grew by the early 1960s under the socialist-backed 
FRELIMO (Liberation Front of Mozambique) Party, with independence finally being achieved 
in June of 1975 in the wake of domestic upheaval in Portugal.  Following independence, some 90% 
of the Portuguese settlers left Mozambique, resulting in a massive deficit of skilled administra-
tors to oversee economic and political function.  The remaining political system under 
FRELIMO maintained a socialist bent, and sought to centralize economic planning by placing 
heavy regulation upon agricultural markets.  
While these economic policies became increasingly problematic, regional political ten-
sions began to mount as well—the FRELIMO party had become an outspoken opponent of the 
Rhodesian and South African apartheid governments, and by the early 1980s Mozambique had 
come under violent aggression from RENAMO (Mozambique National Resistance), an apart-
heid-backed anti-socialist group created to destabilize unfriendly governments in the region.  The 
violent outbreaks eventually escalated into an all-out conflict, and atrocities against civilian pop-
ulations resulted in the deaths of as many as 1 million people (Tarp et al. 2002). Meanwhile, 
what little infrastructure had been left by the Portuguese was largely destroyed, and the costs of 
failed economic policies coupled with increased defense spending pushed external debt to unsus-
tainable levels. 
1986 saw the collapse of the Mozambique economy as civil war, misguided economic 
policies, and macroeconomic instability converged to topple the already weakened authority of 
the central government.  In 1987, the FRELIMO-controlled government introduced the Econom-
21 
 
ic Rehabilitation Plan (Tarp et al. 2002, p.27) with the support of the IMF and the World Bank 
which employed “standard” structural adjustments.  Prices were largely liberalized, however 
minimum producer prices for certain items, including common beans, remained in effect until as 
recently as 1996 (World Bank 2006; Tarp et al. 2002). 
The ending of violence in 1992, along with stabilization efforts, reversed the economic 
decline experienced throughout the 1980s.  Over the past decade, Mozambique has largely stabi-
lized, with income steadily increasing as inflation was brought to sustainable levels and the mac-
roeconomic environment strengthened. 
 
Figure 5. Source World Bank WDI 2011. 
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 The effects of historical circumstances, although diminishing, remain persistent through-
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sulted in severely inadequate infrastructure—currently only 20-25% of roadways are paved, and 
what railways do exist travel primarily from east to west and connect the major port cities of Bei-
ra, Sofala, and Maputo with neighboring countries to the west.    
 
Table 1 Road Quality by Region (kilometers) 
 
Road Quality 
Region Primary Secondary Tertiary Grand Total 
North 2937.8 (21.4%) 10257.3 (74.8%) 512.8 (3.7%) 13708.0 
South 2462.8 (28.6%) 5973.9 (69.4%) 168.8 (2.0% 8605.6 
Total 5400.6 (24.2%) 16231.2 (72.7% 681.7 (3.1%) 22313.6 
 Source: World Bank GIS data 
 
Table 2. Road Quality by Region (kilometers) 
  North South % Difference 
Average Travel Time Between Marketplaces 
(minutes) 
764.1 650.1 17.54% 
Average Distance Between Marketplaces (km) 668.6 656.0 1.91% 
 Source: World Bank GIS data 
The inadequacy of infrastructure is overwhelming—in an extreme example we find there exists 
essentially no transportation linkages that cross the Zambezi River, a condition that effectively 
isolates the northern and southern provinces from one another.
2
 
                                                     
2
 Prior to 2009, there were only two bridges linking the northern and southern regions—one is in the northwestern 
town of Tete, while the other—the so-called Dona Ana Bridge—connected the market towns of Villa de Sena and 
Mutarara.  While the Dona Ana bridge offered the most direct and convenient route over the Zambezi, it was de-
stroyed during the civil war and was not rebuilt until 1995 as a single-lane auto bridge.  The Dona Ana was closed 
again for renovation in 2006.  A third alternative has existed for some time—a ferry at the city of Caia offered 
transportation between the north and south, however it was expensive, time consuming, and service was often 
interrupted due to flood conditions on the Zambezi.  In 2009, construction ended on a new bridge that will replace 
the Caia ferry.     
23 
 
 
      Figure 6.  
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The Agricultural Economy 
 Mozambique is primarily rural, with approximately 70% of its population living outside 
of urban areas (World Bank 2011).  Consequently, agriculture has remained a vital component of 
the Mozambican economy—current estimates show that agricultural output accounts for up to 32% 
of GDP and likewise employs 80% of the current labor force.  In addition, the majority of crop 
production is carried out by smallholder farmers, making an analysis of the agricultural market 
system especially relevant to discussions on overall welfare conditions (Donovan and Tostão 
2010, World Bank 2011).   
 Agricultural systems are not homogeneous across Mozambique, but vary according to 
region.  The northern provinces, for instance, have favorable agro-climatic conditions for crop 
production, while the south has less arable land and is more susceptible to drought.   Furthermore, 
the north is in general more rural, whereas the south is host to some of Mozambique’s larger ur-
ban centers, including the capital city Maputo.
3
  The discontinuous transportation routes between 
the north and south, however mean that northern provinces often generate a net surplus of crops 
and are hence net exporters of agricultural goods to neighboring Malawi (Tschirley and Santos).  
In contrast, the south often experiences production shortages and is in turn a net importer of 
foodstuffs from South Africa.   
Table 3.  Average Crop Prices between the Northern and Southern Provinces 
 
Avg. Price (2005 Meticals/kg) 
Crop North South % Difference 
Common Beans 0.15 0.18 21% 
Lrg. Groundnuts 0.10 0.20 97% 
Ordinary Rice 0.13 0.12 -6% 
White Maize  0.03 0.04 31% 
                      Source: SIMA 2011 
                                                     
3
 For an interesting analysis of regional staple crop production and trade using GIS spatial analysis, see Tschirley, 
Haggblade, and Longabaugh (2009) 
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 The findings presented thus far outline the importance of agriculture for both providing a 
livelihood to a majority of Mozambicans as well as for promoting overall economic growth and 
stability.  Likewise, we find that current market institutions and infrastructures are often insuffi-
cient to allow for the optimal flow of goods between marketplaces, and are likewise vastly dif-
ferent between the northern and southern regions.  Subsequent empirical analysis will therefore 
remain mindful of these structural elements of the Mozambican economy as we construct analyt-
ical specifications.   
Cell Phone Data 
 Cell phones were introduced in Mozambique in 1997 through a state-owned entity called 
MCel.  At the beginning, access to mobile service was limited by the fact that a mobile account 
required a contract and “proof of good credit,” a policy that precluded a large number of users 
(Brower & Brito 2012).  These restrictions were relaxed in 2001, and by 2003 the mobile market 
saw the competitive entry of a private operator, Vodacom (Brower & Brito 2012, Ngugi et al. 
2007).   
 The introduction and subsequent liberalization of the mobile market in Mozambique has 
in turn catalyzed a trend of rapid adoption that mirrors that of other nations around the globe.   
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Figure 7. Source ITU (2010). 
Coupled with the discussion thus far, the implications for the trends depicted in Figure 7 
become clear—in a large country where poor telecommunications and transportation infrastruc-
ture make communication difficult, the introduction of a mobile phone may well hold significant 
promise as a means of bridging the discontinuities between marketplaces, and could in turn pro-
mote an overall shift towards efficiency in the agricultural sector.  
As networks developed, operators began to extend network coverage throughout 
Mozambique—while coverage was first implemented in major cities and along major roadways, 
by 2009 we find that all but two marketplaces (Angónia and Manica) in our sample had received 
a cell tower.
4
  
 
                                                     
4
 Note:  In this context, we define a market as being “treated” if there is a cell tower proximate to the market area 
itself.   
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Table 4.  Year of Mobile Service Introduction 
Marketplace  Year Province North or South 
Alto Mol 2004 Zambezia North 
Angoche 2003 Nampula North 
Angónia not covered Tete North 
Beira 2000 Sofala South 
Caia 2004 Sofala South 
Chimoio 2000 Manica South 
Chókwè 1999 Gaza South 
Cuamba 2003 Niassa North 
Gorongoz 2003 Sofala South 
Homoíne 2004 Inhambane South 
Inhamban 2001 Inhambane South 
Lichinga 2002 Niassa North 
Mafalala 1997 Maputo South 
Manica not covered Manica South 
Maputo 1997 Maputo South 
Massinga 2003 Inhambane South 
Maxixe 2001 Inhambane South 
Milange 2004 Zambezia North 
Mocuba 2003 Zambezia North 
Monapo 2005 Nampula North 
Montepue 2003 Cabo Delgado North 
Mutarara 2006 Tete North 
Nacala 2001 Nampula North 
Nampula 2001 Nampula North 
Nhamatan 2003 Sofala South 
Pemba 2002 Cabo Delgado North 
Queliman 2001 Zambezia North 
Ribáuè 2005 Nampula North 
Tete 2001 Tete South 
Vilancul 2002 Inhambane South 
Sena 2006 Sofala South 
Xai Xai 2002 Gaza South 
    
  
 Survey data, both through official government reports as well as additional academic 
work, estimates that the number of active mobile phones in Mozambique is between 2.7-3.1 mil-
lion users (Brouwer and Brito 2012).  Although generating an exact figure is difficult due to the 
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nature of pre-paid service, the undisputed fact remains that mobile phones are becoming increas-
ingly available throughout Mozambique.  As these trends of adoption continue and the “network” 
effect of mobiles continues to grow, we expect that information gaps will largely disappear and 
we should in turn see a discernible effect of mobiles in our sample price data. 
 
Data              
 This study employs three primary datasets.  The first includes price data from the Sistema 
De Informação De Mercados Agrícolas De Moçambique, or SIMA, which reports the prices of 
27 items from 32 distinct market areas across Mozambique.  For the sake of analysis, we focus 
on one particular crop within the SIMA archives, Common Beans.  The reasoning for this selec-
tion is twofold—first, common beans (also known as sweet beans or feijão manteiga) are an es-
sential commodity for the Mozambique agricultural economy—estimates taken from government 
survey data indicate that the production of common beans increased by over 90% between the 
‘95/‘96 and ‘02/’03 harvest seasons (owing largely to increases in consumer demand) while oth-
er sources find that common beans are a significant source of calories across all income groups 
(Boughton et al. 2006).    Second, the SIMA dataset contains a large number of missing values 
for certain series, and, consistent with their economic importance, common beans contain some 
of the most thorough series within our dataset. 
 SIMA reports data beginning in 1991, however there are a large number of missing values 
in many of the series during the initial years of the program.  Furthermore, the political and regu-
latory climate in the early 1990s adds further reason to be skeptical of these early data.  For these 
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reasons, we choose to drop observations prior to 1997.  Table 3 provides summary statistics for 
Common Beans. 
5
 
Table 5-Summary Statistics for Common Beans 
Region/Province # Obs Avg. price (2005 meticals/kg.) s.d. 
North  36491 0.149 0.110 
Cabo Delgado 5387 0.182 0.117 
Nampula 15637 0.141 0.117 
Niassa 3257 0.146 0.101 
Tete 3212 0.139 0.089 
Zambezia 8998 0.149 0.100 
South 40113 0.181 0.113 
Gaza 5457 0.205 0.122 
Inhambane 10914 0.158 0.131 
Manica 7673 0.195 0.100 
Maputo 6204 0.210 0.083 
Sofala 6504 0.159 0.108 
Tete 3361 0.172 0.090 
Grand Total 76660 0.166 0.112 
Source: SIMA 2011 
The second dataset consists of cell phone tower locations along with the year each tower 
was constructed.  We then use ArcGIS mapping software to generate a series of coverage varia-
bles (described below) for use in our analysis.  Due to the potential for selection bias in the 
placement of cell towers, a primary concern for our empirical work centers on the pattern with 
which these towers were introduced.  Analysis of the rollout of mobile towers over time (see fig-
ure below) suggests that cell phone service was introduced gradually, and with preference given 
to urban areas.   
As urban coverage became complete, it appears that a second wave of network expansion 
occurred along the major roadways between the various market towns and cities.  Visual inspec-
tion of these data suggests that the rollout of mobile networks is unlikely to be random, and 
                                                     
5
 The Metical is the official currency used in Mozambique.  In 2005/2006 the Bank of Mozambique redenominated 
the Metical at a rate of 1000:1, which accounts for the large difference in prices reported between various graphs 
and charts throughout the text. 
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hence there is a risk of simultaneity bias between the introduction of a cell tower and the tem-
poral shift in price dispersion.  However, due to the fact that we cannot be certain as to the rea-
soning behind the placement of towers, and are likewise left without a candidate instrument to 
employ, we are left to assume that the placement of towers is either exogenous, or, more likely, 
that the endogenous nature of the treatment effect is unlikely to cause significant bias in our es-
timates.   
The final dataset consists of high-resolution GIS files that include road networks, road 
quality, and various other forms of infrastructure.  We then employ ArcGIS to construct spatial 
variables such as road distance and travel time, as well as several measures of proximity.   
 
Section III—Empirical Strategy  
        
 The current literature on the microeconomic impacts of mobile phones offers several sim-
ilar but distinct strategies for analysis.  Early work by Eggleston et al. (2002), finds that markets 
in rural China gain efficiency and experience increases in producer and consumer welfare after 
the introduction of basic telecommunications.  Jensen (2007) contributes by observing that the 
expansion of mobile networks to rural Indian fishing markets dramatically lowers the dispersion 
and variation of prices among marketplaces, and coordinately reduces wasted catches.  
 The most relevant example in the literature—and indeed the empirical basis for the cur-
rent study—comes from work by Aker (2008, 2010) on rural Nigerien grain markets.  Using ag-
ricultural price data coupled with information on the rollout of mobile networks, Aker finds that 
the introduction of cellular telephones has a significant impact across the marketplaces in her 
sample, with an estimated 10-16% reduction in the overall dispersion of prices.   
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The framework outlined by Aker provides an appealing avenue for the current study.  
The similarity between the markets under investigation, for instance, makes a transfer of meth-
ods appropriate, while the spatial and temporal trends that exist in her sample mirror those found 
in the Mozambique economy.   
 
Basic Specification 
Following the framework developed by Aker (2008, 2010), our empirical strategy speci-
fies a basic model of the following form:   
 
                         ∑     
  
   ∑     
  
    ∑     
  
                           (1) 
6
 
 
where bothcov is a dummy variable equal to one in years where both marketplaces have cell 
phone coverage,    and     are market-specific fixed-effects (where i ≠ j and i<j ),     is a time 
period fixed-effect (quarterly), and drought is a dummy variable equal to one in years when there 
is a drought in Mozambique.
7
    
In the basic form specified above, equation (1) estimates the “average” impact of mobile 
phone rollout by pooling treatment effects across all market pairs.  We will then expand upon the 
basic specification to consider how the impact of cell phones differs along factors such as dis-
tance, travel time, transfer costs, “network effects,” and other heterogeneous factors shown to 
                                                     
6
 Equation (1) can be estimated either in levels or by taking first-differences.  The latter method is appealing be-
cause it controls for issues posed by non-stationarity in our series, however employing first-differences coordinate-
ly removes a large portion of the variation in our explanatory variables and diminishes the power of our tests.  We 
find no evidence (see Appendix C) of unit roots in any of our series, and consequently opt to estimate equation (1) 
in levels.  We control for heterogeneity and serial correlation employing robust standard errors, and cluster by 
market pair. 
7
 Drought data was obtained from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters’ International Disaster 
Database.  
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affect price dispersion.  While we would like to incorporate transfer costs into our specification, 
due to a paucity of available data we were only able to obtain transfer costs estimates for a small 
subsample of years and subsequently omit this variable from our model.  Using this smaller sub-
sample, however, we find that our estimated coefficients for bothcov actually increases when we 
include estimated transfer costs, suggesting that this omission will cause us to, if anything, un-
derestimate the effect of mobile phones (See Appendix D for details).    
In all cases, the key hypothesis is that information voids and high search costs prevent 
markets from achieving efficient outcomes, and consequently the introduction of mobile service 
to a market pair (as expressed by bothcov) will systematically reduce the dispersion of prices 
across all marketplaces.  Our parameter of interest is therefore   .    
 
The remainder of this section is outlined as follows.  First, we consider the differential 
impact of mobiles across Mozambique’s northern and southern regions, and accordingly define a 
sub-sample of our data.  Second, we estimate the average treatment effect across all market pairs 
in our sample.  Finally, we consider the potential heterogeneous effects of mobile phone rollout 
across both spatial and temporal dimensions.  We conclude with an analysis of our results and 
discuss the plausible implications of our findings. 
 
Regional Effects 
We begin our empirical investigation by considering the potential heterogeneous effects 
of mobile phones across different regions within Mozambique.  You will recall from Section II 
that the country is effectively divided between the north and the south, whereby infrastructure 
constraints severely limit interregional trade.  Given the distinct structural circumstances of each 
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zone, we have reason to suspect, a priori, that the treatment effect of mobile phones will accord-
ingly vary.  Column 1 of Table 6 displays the estimated average treatment effect across all mar-
ket pairs in our sample,
8
 while Columns 2 & 3 consider only those market pairs in the northern 
and southern regions respectively. 
 
Table 6.  Estimated Impact of Cell Phone Rollout on Price Dispersion (Common Beans)--
Regional Effects   
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable (Priceit-Pricekt) All Marketplaces Northern Mkts Only Southern Mkts Only 
    Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) -0.39 0.16 -1.49*** 
 
0.49 0.74 0.55 
Constant 6.15*** 5.44*** 16.54*** 
 
0.68 0.68 1.92 
Drought Year Dummy -1.53491* -0.07024 0.38928 
 
0.87005 0.56913 1.31776 
Quarterly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Market-Specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-Sample All Markets Northern Mkts Southern Mkts 
Observations 15550 9083 6467 
Adjusted R-squared 0.18 0.2 0.2 
Robust standard errors in italics 
   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
   
 When we look across all market locations in our sample, we observe no significant effect 
of mobile phones on price dispersion.  When we consider the two regions separately, however, 
the story changes dramatically—while there remains no significant effect in the north, we ob-
serve a negative and significant effect on price dispersion among southern marketplaces.  An ex-
planation for this differentiation in cell phones effects lies in the structural differences between 
these two regions—the north, for instance, is generally more rural than the south, and road net-
                                                     
8
 Note that, due to infrastructure considerations, we omit all pairs that are divided from north to south—that is, 
we omit market pairs where one market is in the southern region while the other is in the north, and vice versa. 
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works and transportation lines are coordinately less developed.  In contrast, the southern region 
is host to the majority of the country’s large urban centers, and likewise has more developed mo-
bile networks than the northern regions (Brower & Brito 2012).  These circumstances, along with 
heterogeneous patterns of urbanization and climate, suggest that factors other than information 
failures are inhibiting trade among marketplaces in the north.  Following the results from Table 6, 
we opt to report in the main body of this thesis an analysis of the southern marketplaces only (we 
do, however, re-estimate the models in Tables 7-10 using only northern marketplaces for com-
parison.  See Appendix E for the corresponding output). 
 
Average Treatment Effects  
 With our sample defined, we continue our analysis by considering the average treatment 
effect of cell phones in greater detail.  Table 7 reports several iterations of the basic specification 
of equation (1), and outlines the various econometric strategies used to evaluate the average 
treatment effects. 
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Table 7.  Estimated Impact of Cell Phone Rollout on Price Dispersion (Common Beans)--Average Treatment Effects   
     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable (Priceit-Pricekt) 
No Time trend w/ Quar-
terly Dummies 
OLS w/ Market-
Specific Fixed-Effects 
Fixed-Effects w/ Mar-
ket-Pair Fixed-Effects 
Variable for one 
market covered 
 
    
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) (aka bothcov) -1.49*** -1.49*** -1.38** -1.68** 
 
0.55 0.55 0.59 0.71 
Cell Phone Dummy (one covered) (aka onecov) 
   
-0.17414 
    
0.53018 
Constant 16.51843*** 16.54*** 7.51*** 16.67*** 
 
1.94086 1.92 0.74 1.9 
Drought Year Dummy 
 
0.38928 2.29278*** 0.33 
  
1.31776 0.60646 1.3 
Quarterly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market-Specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes 
Sub-Sample Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts 
Observations 6467 6467 6467 6467 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 0.2 
 
0.2 
Number of Groups -- -- 110 -- 
Robust standard errors in italics 
    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Due to the potential seasonal effects of agricultural prices, we begin in Column 1 by re-
porting the average treatment effect for all southern market pairs using quarterly fixed-effects, 
and find that the magnitude of the coefficient on bothcov is both negative and significant.  The 
estimated coefficient on bothcov in Column 1 therefore suggests that, on average, the estimated 
impact of being mutually connected to another market pair will lower price dispersion by an es-
timated 1.49 meticals per kilo.  Column 2 adds a drought year variable to the model, and while 
we find the coefficient on drought is indeed significant, there is no appreciable difference in our 
coefficient of interest.   
 
Unobservables and Omitted Variable Bias 
 A central concern in the current study is the existence of unobservable inter- and intra-
market traits and omitted variable bias.   We attempt to account for these potential biases by em-
ploying a fixed-effect framework, and include controls along both temporal and spatial dimen-
sions.   
Implementing a fixed-effects methodology across the spatial dimension, however, offers 
two potential strategies—the first method is to employ a market pair specific fixed-effects esti-
mator, while the second strategy would be to include a separate dummy variable for each indi-
vidual market in a particular market pair in our specification.  The former method is perhaps the 
more “effective” strategy, as such an estimator will remove all unobserved effects that exist 
among each unique pair, however by construction a pair-specific fixed-effects estimator ignores 
all variation in our explanators across market pairs in our sample.   
Alternatively, we can include a dummy variable for each individual market in a pair—
such a strategy will control for the unobserved heterogeneity unique to each marketplace (but not 
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necessarily between a specific pairing) without sacrificing the information contained in the varia-
tion across all pairs in our sample. We rely on the second strategy because the first strategy sacri-
fices too much information, and consequently find that we are unable to achieve efficient esti-
mates.    
For the sake of comparison, Column 3 re-estimates the model in Column 3 using a mar-
ket-pair fixed-effect.  Although we still observe a negative and significant effect of mobile 
phones, our point estimate and significance level for bothcov decrease slightly.  Furthermore, we 
find that when we augment the model to include additional covariates, the market-pair fixed-
effects framework eliminates too much of the cross-market variation in our explanators to obtain 
significant results (results not reported).        
Column 4 in turn considers the effect of mobile phones in instances where only one mar-
ketplace in a market pair receives a cell tower (as indicated by the dummy variable onecov).  
Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that cell phones have no significant effect on the price 
dispersion between market pairs where only one location has mobile coverage.
9
 
 
Overall, the results in Table 7 find that the introduction of mobile phones throughout 
Mozambique has had a significant effect on price behavior in the market for common beans.  
These findings are consistent with our hypothesis, and lend support to the notion that informa-
tional failures are indeed a contributing factor to persistent price dispersion in the agricultural 
sector.   
                                                     
9
 A priori, we expect the coefficient on onecov to be insignificant.  Our hypothesis maintains that mobiles effective-
ly lower search costs to traders and farmers— it therefore follows that in instances where a marketplace remains 
isolated (i.e. in instances where onecov equals 1) the reductions in search costs cannot be realized, and hence we 
find no effect.  See Appendix F  for a more detailed discussion.  
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Heterogeneous Effects 
 
The results presented thus far depict the average effect of treatment throughout all mar-
kets in our sub-sample, and lend support to the notion that mobile phones are enhancing market 
efficiency in a systemic manner throughout Mozambique’s agricultural system.  
While these results enforce the overall effect of mobiles, they fail to provide insight into 
the specific channels through which mobiles are facilitating market function.  That is, are mobile 
phones more effective in instances where markets are further apart, or are connected by roads of 
poorer quality?  Does the efficacy of mobiles change when we consider the size and importance 
of a market place?  These questions are particularly interesting in the context of understanding 
the welfare outcomes of mobile phone implementation, and likewise provide the empirical detail 
necessary to inform policy-related issues. 
 To answer these questions, we augment the basic specification defined thus far and test 
for possible heterogeneous effects of mobile phones across a multitude of dimensions.  The fol-
lowing table outlines our results (for ease of comparison, Column 1 repeats the results of our 
basic specification in Column 3 of Table 7). 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable (Pi t-Pi j)
Basic 
Specification
Time Dummies
Distance 
Dummies
Market Sizes
Network Effects-
Teledensity
Network Effects-
Total # of Mrkts 
Covered
Coverage 
Density
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) -1.49*** -0.99* -1.02 -0.29 1.75
0.55 0.58 0.73 0.67 3.73
Coverage Density (25km radius) -2.08*
1.17
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) * Shrt time. Dummy (<3 hrs) -0.78032
0.60079
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) * Med time. Dummy (3-6 hrs) -2.52***
0.67
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) * Long time. Dummy (6-12 hrs) -0.31
0.47
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered)*ln(tot. mrkts covered) -1.25393
1.54783
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered)*ln(teledensity) -0.71967*
0.40949
Cell*Mkt Size Dummy (both major) -0.79
0.87
Cell*Mkt Size Dummy (one major) -1.59290***
0.55383
Cell*Mkt Size Dummy (both minor) -1.91***
0.7
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) * Short Distance Dummy (<150km) -2.18**
1.09
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) * Med. Distance Dummy (150-500km) -0.24
0.78
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) * Long Distance Dummy (500-1000km) -0.60569
0.58662
Constant 16.54*** 16.31*** 16.63*** 16.75*** 16.32*** 16.64*** 16.19***
1.92 1.92 1.9 1.88 1.9 1.93 1.93
Drought Year Dummy 0.38928 0.5 0.32 0.32 0.36 0.18 0.95753
1.31776 1.3 1.32 1.32 1.35 1.42 1.17366
Quarterly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market-Specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-Sample Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts
Observations 6467 6467 6467 6467 6467 6467 6467
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 0.21 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Robust standard errors in italics
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 8.  Effect of Cell Phone Rollout on Price Dispersion-Heterogeneous Effects 
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Distance & Travel Time 
 Column 2 considers the heterogeneous effect on mobile phones and travel time between 
market pairs.
10
  Given the additional costs associated with increased travel time, we expect that 
the interaction between our cell phone dummy and travel time variable will be negative and sig-
nificant—if mobiles allow traders to effectively search for prices in distant markets, then the in-
troduction of a mobile connection will result in a higher volume of trade than would otherwise 
have taken place as traders become more likely to observe and exploit arbitrage opportunities as 
they arise.  Put another way, in the absence of accurate or reliable price information, any poten-
tial arbitrage decision is made with some degree of uncertainty on the part of the trader.  As the 
transfer costs increase between two markets, the potential costs of this uncertainty will coordi-
nately grow as well.  With the introduction of a mobile phone, a trader can know, prior to com-
mitting to travel from one market to another, whether such a trade will be profitable.  The hy-
pothesized result is that cell phones will remove these uncertainties, and promote profitable 
trades that would have otherwise been missed.    
Column 2 reports the interaction effect of mobile coverage and with several travel time 
dummy variables.  Interestingly, we find no significant effect for markets that are either relative-
ly close or relatively far from one another (<3 hours and >6 hours respectively), however we do 
find a significant effect of mobile phones among markets that are between 3-6 hours apart.  In 
the context of the hypothesis above, these results suggest that mobiles are indeed expanding the 
regional footprint of traders—in the case of nearby market pairs, it is likely that preexisting net-
works allow for positive information exchange through some other means (potentially by person 
                                                     
10
 Travel times are represented here as approximate travel times by car or truck.  The data for this variable come 
from high-resolution World Bank GIS datasets that formulate travel times based on road distance, quality, and 
other structural impediments. 
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or prior experience), while markets that exceed 6 hours in travel time are simply too far for prof-
itable arbitrage to exist regardless of whether information is available or not (in such a case, we 
would expect that the transfer costs exceed the price differential in all but extreme circumstanc-
es).   
The significant effect we see for markets separated by this “middle distance” in turn sug-
gests that the introduction of mobile phones is allowing traders to increase the scope of their 
trade networks.  Whereas before information gaps made trade with these more distant markets 
potentially risky, the advent of mobiles appears to facilitate the exchange of information neces-
sary to incentivize traders to act upon arbitrage opportunities that were previously unknown.  
 Column 3 reports a similar specification, employing market-pair distance dummies rather 
than travel time dummies.  Given that both Columns 2 & 3 are effectively measuring some ele-
ment of transport costs associated with road travel, we expect that these results will be similar.  
Furthermore, because our “travel time” variable takes into account road distance as well as road 
quality data, we rely on it as a more accurate measurement.  Regardless, we still find that mobile 
phones and road distance have a negative and significant interactive effect on price dispersion.  
 
Market Size 
In Column 4 we consider the influence of marketplace size and importance using dummy 
variables to determine whether both marketplaces are “major” markets, whether only one is “ma-
jor,” or whether both are “minor.”11  A priori, we expect that the effect of cell phones will be 
more pronounced in pairs that contain a minor marketplace, whereas the effect will be smaller in 
cases where both marketplaces are larger.  The underlying assumption is that preexisting infor-
                                                     
11
 We use market size/importance classifications taken from USAID/FEWS  
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mation flows are likely to exist between established marketplaces (perhaps due to fixed-line te-
lephony, or radio), while smaller markets are coordinately less integrated into regional trade pat-
terns. 
In line with our hypothesis, we find that the effect of mobile phones varies according to 
marketplace size, whereby mobiles have a large and significant effect in cases where only one 
marketplace is “major” or when both are “minor.”  These results in turn suggests that mobile 
phones are being used to connect outlying markets into primary trade patterns, and hence ac-
count for the large overall average treatment effect reported in the previous section.  
 
Network Effects 
 As the number of mobile users increases, the potential benefits of belonging to the net-
work increase to each individual user as well.  This spillover, or “network” effect, is clearly seen 
in the absorption patterns across countries.  Recall from Figures 2 & 3 in the introduction that 
adoption of mobile telephones increases to a break-point—typically around 15-20%--before 
teledensity levels begin to grow in an exponential fashion.  These phenomena are likely to appear 
in our data as the increased usage of mobiles will in turn increase the number of connected indi-
viduals and hence the overall amount of information available.  The specification in Column 5 
addresses the network effect phenomenon by including an interaction term between our coverage 
variable and a measure of overall mobile “teledensity” (where teledensity is measured as the nat-
ural logarithm of the number of mobile subscribers per 100 people in the population).  Interest-
ingly, we find a significant effect of teledensity on price dispersion, however our point estimates 
for the interaction term remain small, and are only marginally significant at the 10% level.  A 
plausible explanation for the weakness of these results is that traders are in fact among the “early 
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adopters” of mobile phones in these regions—in such a scenario, the effect of cell phones is still 
realized within the market for common beans, however the continued addition of mobile sub-
scribers by non-market persons is of no consequence.   
We test this intuition by replacing teledensity with an alternative measure of network size 
(in this case, the total number of marketplaces covered by cell service), and re-estimate the speci-
fication from Column 6.  Interestingly, we find that while the interaction between our coverage 
dummy and the new measure of network size does in fact have a negative and a larger-in-
magnitude coefficient than does the coefficient on Cell Phone Dummy*log Teledensity, we find 
that the effect is insignificant.   
While the observed relationship is in fact insignificant, it is important to note that the 
standard errors are large and our failure to obtain significant results may be driven by a lack of 
variation in the underlying explanators.  Indeed visual inspection of the data reveals that this is a 
distinct possibility: 
 
Figure 8. Number of Southern Marketplaces Covered by Mobile Service 
As Figure 8 indicates, adoption among marketplaces in the south was strong throughout 
the early years, but reached a saturation point in 2004.  While the early period in our sample 
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shows some amount of variation, the relatively static nature of adoption in the latter portion of 
our time series along with the relatively few marketplaces in our sample may in fact be masking 
the underlying network effects and preventing us from obtaining significant results.  
The conclusion from Columns 5 and 6 is that while we see downward pressure on price 
dispersion as a result of these “network effects,” we find that there is an insufficient amount of 
variation in our data to derive significant estimates. 
Coverage Density vs. Coverage Dummies 
In Column 7 we re-estimate the specification in Column 1 using an alternative indicator 
of cell phone coverage that measures the percentage of a marketplace’s surrounding area (within 
a 25km radius) that is covered by cell service (see appendix G for a detailed discussion on this 
variable).  The theoretical assumption with these alternative density variables is that they allow 
us to trace the impact of mobile phones from the farmers in the areas surrounding a marketplace 
to the traders who operate between market locations and consequently to the overall dispersion 
of prices among marketplaces.  The intuition is that although a simple dummy variable for the 
presence of a cell tower allows us to determine whether market centers are “connected,” we can-
not directly comment on whether farmers who live in the areas outside the market center—but 
that interact with the marketplace itself—have access to mobile coverage.   
In the case of coverage dummy variables, we are therefore implicitly limiting ourselves to 
understanding the impact of mobile phones as they are used by inter-regional traders—by con-
sidering the quality of cell phone reception in the areas surrounding a marketplace, we are able to 
at least glimpse at the degree to which cell phones play the additional role of informing the 
famers themselves of when—and if possible where—to bring their goods to obtain the highest 
price. 
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Furthermore, coverage density variables are likely to be a more accurate measure of cell 
phone coverage than simple dummies—in certain cases, it appears that while there is no cell 
tower within the marketplace area itself, the area still receives mobile coverage from other near-
by towers.   In these cases, we may mistakenly consider a market location as untreated when in 
fact participants within these market areas have access to mobile networks.  Using this alterna-
tive measure of price dispersion, we find that our point estimates of the impact of mobile phones 
is larger in magnitude than the coefficient on our coverage dummies, and remains statistically 
significant at the 10% level.   For the sake of comparison, we re-estimate several of the models 
from Table 8 using coverage density variables instead of coverage dummies.  These results can 
be reviewed in Appendix B. 
Temporal Effects 
 While we have shown that price dispersion decreases as a result of the mere introduction 
of mobile networks, we remain interested in the possibility that these effects may change over 
time.  Indeed as mobile networks become more established and patterns of use evolve among 
traders and farmers, we expect that the effect of mobile telephony will become more pronounced 
as this new technology becomes integrated into normal market behavior.  Column 2 of Table 9 
considers this phenomenon by interacting our cell phone dummy with a quarterly time trend 
(Column 1 repeats the basic specification for ease of comparison).   
Although our coefficient on the cell phone coverage dummy becomes insignificant, we 
find that there is a negative and significant effect of an interaction with a quarterly time trend, 
suggesting that mobiles become more effective with time.  While these results may in fact be 
capturing the residual effect of the increased network coverage that is simultaneously occurring, 
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a feasible alternative is that patterns of adoption and implementation are becoming more efficient 
as users gain experience with this new technology. 
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Table 9. Effect of Cell Phone Rollout on Price Dispersion- Temporal Effects 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable (Priceit-Pricekt) 
Basic Specifi-
cation 
Temporal Effects-
Cell Coverage 
over Time 
OLS w/ Lagged 
Dependent Vari-
able 
A-Bond Esti-
mator 
     Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) -1.49*** 3.86 -0.75*** -0.42 
 
0.55 2.43 0.27 0.71 
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered)*quarter (time trend) 
 
-0.09282** 
  
  
0.04535 
  Lagged Dependent Variable (1 period lag)-Common Beans 
  
0.52491*** 0.01901 
   
0.01947 0.0251458 
Constant 16.54*** 16.30*** -0.3 
 
 
1.92 1.89 3.43 
 Drought Year Dummy 0.38928 0.34 -0.49 2.13461 
 
1.31776 1.35 0.5 1.95084 
Quarterly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market-Specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-Sample Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts 
Observations 6467 6467 5797 12468 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 0.21 0.41 -- 
Number of Groups -- -- -- 188 
Robust standard errors in italics 
    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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An additional consideration we test for is the possibility of a lagged effect from the de-
pendent variable.  Indeed in cases where information flows slowly between distant marketplaces, 
we expect that previously known prices are likely to be a strong guiding force in the decision 
making-process of farmers and traders.  To account for the effects of prior price dispersion on 
current outcomes, we augment specification in Column 2 to include a lagged dependent variable 
and re-estimate using OLS.  Using this methodology, we still observe a negative and significant 
effect of mobile phones on price dispersion, however our point estimates are considerably dimin-
ished.  To account for the possibility of a dynamic panel, we further refine our specification and 
employ the Arellano-Bond estimator.  Although we still see a negative effect on our coefficient 
of interest, our standard errors are of such a magnitude that we are unable to obtain significant 
results.  These findings suggest that there is a strong lagged effect in the observed price behavior, 
and likewise hints at the fact that mobiles maintain their influence.  Ultimately, however, we are 
left to the conclusion that our data lacks the variation necessary to generate definitive significant 
results.  
Conclusion and Remarks  
 The estimates reported in Tables 6-9 demonstrate the efficiency-enhancing effects of mo-
bile phones and lend strong support to the theoretical discussion outlined in the previous section.   
Looking at the average treatment effect across all marketplaces in the southern region, for exam-
ple, we find that the introduction of mobile phones reduces price dispersion by approximately 
1.49 meticals/kilo.  These results are indeed compelling, and lend further support to the current 
policy debate that mobile phones can impart beneficial outcomes to developing markets.   
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Although we find significant overall effects of treatment in our sample, it is important to 
note that our estimates are both smaller in magnitude and significance than we would expect giv-
en results found in similar studies.  In addition, we find no discernible impact when we look at 
the northern marketplaces or across other commodities reported within the SIMA database.   
 
Table 10.  Effect of Cell Phone Rollout on Price Dispersion-
Additional Crops       
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable (Priceit-Pricekt) 
Common 
Beans 
Lrg. Ground-
nuts 
White 
Maize Rice 
Wheat 
Flour 
      Cell Phone Dummy -1.49*** -0.07 0.09 -0.01 -0.06 
 
0.55 0.58 0.07 0.18 0.31 
Drought Year Dummy 0.38928 0.11855 -0.474*** -0.52889* -0.2391 
 
1.31776 0.48361 0.16865 0.2754 0.19325 
Constant 16.54*** 4.28*** 1.29*** 1.30*** 0.31 
 
1.92 1.19 0.16 0.35 0.77 
Quarterly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market-Specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-Sample 
Southern 
Mkts 
Southern 
Mkts 
Southern 
Mkts 
Southern 
Mkts 
Southern 
Mkts 
Observations 6467 6072 7569 7606 3685 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 0.18 0.2 0.24 0.33 
Robust standard errors in italics 
   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 10 provides a glimpse into other areas of the agricultural markets and dramatically 
illustrates the near zero effect of mobiles on price dispersion in similar settings within Mozam-
bique.   
Given the success of mobile phones found in similar studies in the literature, we are left 
to consider plausible alternatives to why we observe such ambiguous and insignificant results.  A 
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simple explanation may be that there is insufficient variability in our explanators, the end result 
of which is that we are simply unable to derive efficient estimates.  
An alternative explanation, however, comes from a separate strand of literature that fo-
cuses on market efficiency from the perspective of spatial efficiency versus spatial integration.  
Recent research by Barrett (2001), for example, argues for a distinction between “spatial integra-
tion” and “spatial efficiency.”  By his designation, the former constitutes a flow-based definition 
where markets are said to be “integrated” with one another if trade exists between various mar-
keting locations. In contrast, markets are said to be “spatial efficient” when traders are able to 
drive price dispersion towards transfer costs, implying that zero marginal benefits exist from ad-
ditional arbitrage in a Pareto equilibrium (Tostao & Brorsen 2005, Barrett 2001).  In cases with 
unrestricted trade and/or perfect integration between marketplaces, efficiency can be measured 
using data on prices and transfer costs whereby a  market pair achieves some level of price dis-
persion such that: 
 
                 |                  |                     for i ≠ k (2) 
    
where efficiency is obtained (i.e. the “Law of One Price” is satisfied) when the expected value of 
equation (2) is 0.   The difficulty with strategies that solely employ price data is that transfer 
costs or any unobserved trade discontinuity (for example due to inadequate transportation infra-
structure or policy changes) will cause biased or inconsistent parameter estimates (Tostao & 
Brorsen 2005 p.206).  In these cases, empirical results may (incorrectly) conclude that integrated 
markets are “statistically uncorrelated and…functionally isolated…[while] markets without trade 
links can be found to be price correlated and deemed efficient” (Tostao & Brorsen 2005).   
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Barrett (2001) further posits that evaluating efficiency based purely on adherence to the 
law of one price equates to assuming “continuous, unrestricted trade flows” (p.23).  In the pres-
ence of disintegrated markets, however, it follows that multiple equilibria may exist conditional 
upon the size and scope of these discontinuities. In such cases, prices between isolated market-
places may be statistically independent, and tests that look only at the equality condition may be 
invalid (p.23). 
  Returning to the case of Mozambique, we find that market disintegration not only exists, 
but is pervasive throughout the country. Several studies, for example by Ciera and Arndt (2008), 
Tostao and Brorsen (2005) and Penzorn & Arndt (2002) find overwhelming evidence—both an-
ecdotal and empirical—that agricultural marketplaces in Mozambique are plagued by trade dis-
continuities, and furthermore that transfer costs constitute a significant amount of the observed 
price dispersion.   
 Connecting these studies with the empirical work in this paper, we propose that the am-
biguous results obtained are not due to the inefficacy of mobile phones per se, but rather our es-
timates are being biased by these persistent trade discontinuities. While we attempt to control for 
these effects as much as possible, the dampened effects seen in the results above as well as in the 
appendices point to the fact that barriers to the flow of goods is likely the limiting factor to mar-
ket efficiency in our sample.     
Overall, the results presented thus far suggest that mobile phones do have a discernible 
impact in the market for common beans.  The reduced magnitude of the treatment effect, howev-
er, along with the discussion concerning integration, points to the fact that the efficacy of mobile 
phones for development—at least in the context of agricultural markets—is predicated on suffi-
cient market integration and a reduction of trade discontinuities.  Going forward, development 
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strategies need to consider these constraints when implementing policies geared toward agricul-
tural development.  From a theoretical standpoint, information remains a key underlying condi-
tion necessary for healthy markets.  The results from the current study, however, remind us of 
the fact that information is merely a complement to other forms of infrastructure, not a substitute.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The current study attempts to provide quantitative insight into the efficacy of mobile te-
lephony for development by considering the specific case of Mozambique’s agricultural com-
modity markets.  Although our study maintains a narrow focus, the results presented here expose 
phenomena and trends that inform research and policy issues throughout other similar develop-
ment settings.  
Overall, we find that while there is a marginal average effect of mobiles in the market for 
common beans, these results are not persistent when we look across other commodities and/or 
regions within Mozambique.  Given these results, we are ultimately left to conclude that infor-
mational constraints are not of paramount importance with regards to market efficiency and inte-
gration in our sample.  In the context of the current literature on mobile telephony, we therefore 
present an important realization whereby cell phones—although shown elsewhere to be both em-
pirically and anecdotally important development tools—are not a panacea but rather are one of 
several possible interventions that must be looked at from a systemic viewpoint.  That said, the 
evidence presented both here and throughout the literature suggests that once certain conditions 
are satisfied (i.e. sufficient infrastructure exists to allow for the free-flow of goods across space) 
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mobiles phones will have an appreciable and significant impact on price dispersion across a 
range of different countries and market types.   
The insignificant results presented in the current study therefore do not undermine the po-
tential of mobile telephony, but rather enforce the need to consider policy interventions from a 
holistic standpoint.  As governments and aid agencies consider new avenues for future strategies, 
it is therefore important to form the realization that efficiency and development can only be 
achieved through the coordination of multiple market systems.  As such, mobile phones are 
unique in that they provide an inexpensive technology that enhances the overall efficiency 
among these various market structures, however without these corresponding market compo-
nents (i.e. transportation infrastructure), there is little room for mobiles to generate any effect 
whatsoever.    
The determination of this study is therefore that while mobile phones may indeed stimu-
late some marginal effect in a given sample, the true potential of this new technology can only be 
utilized given that additional constraints do not further limit the ability of markets to function.  
From a policy standpoint, it is therefore vital that future strategies promote mobile network de-
velopment in tandem with transportation infrastructure enhancement.  In some sense, the result 
of these two forms of development are greater than the sum of their parts, whereby the simulta-
neous increase in information coupled with decreased transportation costs will promote inter-
marketplace trade, facilitate optimal arbitrage, and generate efficient market outcomes.   
Further research on the subject of mobile phones is therefore necessary to build a more 
solid understanding of the microeconomic impacts of mobile phones for development.  The cur-
rent microeconomics literature, although compelling, is limited in size and scope.  As mobile 
networks continue to expand and patterns of use continue to evolve, further investigation will 
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remain an important means of understanding the manner in which mobiles function, and will 
help promote the beneficial outcomes this new technology can impart on the development trajec-
tories of the third world. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A-Additional Summary Statistics 
 
Table A-Summary Statistics            
Variable  Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
 
    
Year 21216 2004.0 3.7 1998.0 2010.0 
Month 21216 159.5 45.0 82.0 237.0 
Coverage Dummy (both markets covered) 21216 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Coverage Dummy (one market covered) 14460 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Est. % of surrounding market area covered by Mobile Coverage (25km radius) 21216 0.5 0.4 0.0 1.0 
Est. % of surrounding market area covered by Mobile Coverage (50km radius) 21216 0.4 0.3 0.0 0.9 
      
Mobile per 100 in the pop. (Country Total) 21216 9.0 10.2 0.0 30.9 
Total Number of Markets Covered 14460 12.2 2.8 8.0 15.0 
Avg. Travel Time between Mrkts. (hours) 21216 10.8 7.0 0.0 26.6 
Avg. Road Distance between Mrkts. 21216 656.0 394.6 0.5 1543.2 
Avg. Travel Time between Mrkts. (mins) 21216 650.1 417.6 0.0 1598.0 
Transfer Cost Estimates (2001-2005 only) 6936 1.1 0.4 0.4 2.1 
Dummy if both markets are "major" markets 21216 0.1 0.3 0.0 1.0 
Dummy if one market in a pair is a "major" market 21216 0.5 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Dummy if both markets are "minor" markets 21216 0.4 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Quarterly Time Trend 21216 53.5 15.0 28.0 79.0 
Drought Year Dummy 21216 0.6 0.5 0.0 1.0 
Average Price, White Maize 7569 -0.2 1.5 -8.8 8.5 
Price Dispersion, White Maize 7569 1.2 1.0 0.0 8.8 
Average Price, Wheat Flour 3685 1.3 3.4 -9.5 13.4 
Price Dispersion, Wheat Flour 3685 2.7 2.4 0.0 13.4 
Average Price, Cow Peas 6219 0.5 6.0 -26.0 26.7 
Price Dispersion, Cow Peas 6219 4.3 4.2 0.0 26.7 
Average Price, Common Beans 6467 0.0 7.6 -30.2 31.8 
Price Dispersion, Common Beans 6467 6.0 4.6 0.0 31.8 
Average Price, Rice 7606 0.4 3.2 -12.2 11.4 
Price Dispersion, Rice 7606 2.5 2.0 0.0 12.2 
Average Price, Sml Groundnuts 6763 0.4 7.1 -55.3 54.7 
Price Dispersion, Sml Groundnuts 6763 5.3 4.8 0.0 55.3 
Average Price, Lrg Groundnuts 6072 0.6 6.2 -22.0 23.0 
Price Dispersion, Lrg Groundnuts 6072 4.9 3.9 0.0 23.0 
Note: Summary Statistics are for Southern Markets Pairs only 
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Appendix B – Coverage Densities 
 The following table re-estimates the models presented in Table 8, using our “coverage 
density” variable in place of our coverage dummy variable. 
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Appendix C-Unit Root Tests  
 The following tables report the findings from our unit root tests.  We first employ the 
Dickey-Fuller methodology and then turn to the Hadri-type test as a check.  While the results 
from both tests suggest there are no unit roots in our series, it should be noted that we had to sig-
nificantly reduce our sample in order to obtain a balanced panel with which to employ the Hadri 
method. 
Table C1. Fisher-type unit-root test        
    Series: Price Dispersion-White Maize Statistic   P-Value 
Inverse chi-squared(868) P 4897.739 0.000 
Inverse normal Z -43.8481 0.000 
Inverse logit t(2164) L* -61.1553 0.000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 96.7168 0.000 
    Series: Price Dispersion-Common Beans       
Inverse chi-squared(858) P 4454.825 0.000 
Inverse normal Z -42.2477 0.000 
Inverse logit t(2069) L* -56.9779 0.000 
Modified inv. chi-squared Pm 86.8282 0.000 
    Ho: All panels contain unit roots           Number of panels       =    442 
   Ha: At least one panel is stationary        Avg. number of periods = 
102.74       
AR parameter: Panel-specific                Asymptotics: T -> Infinity 
   Panel means:  Included 
   Time trend:   Not included 
   Drift term:   Not included                  ADF regressions: 2 lags       
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The Following reports the Hadri-type specification. 
Table C2. Hadri LM Type Unit-Root Test           
      Series: Price Dispersion-Common Beans Statistic P-Value # of Panels # of Periods 
 
Z 0.7467 0.2276 3 108 
            
Ho: All panels are stationary                
     Ha: Some panels contain unit roots           
Time trend:         Not included            Asymptotics: T, N -> Infinity 
  Heteroskedasticity: Not robust                                sequentially 
   LR variance:        (not used)           
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Appendix D- Travel Costs and Constrained Sample Years 
The “Law of One Price” stipulates that the prices dispersion of homogeneous goods be 
driven to the transfer cost between the two points of sale in order to obtain an efficient outcome.  
Transfer costs therefore form an important component of any analysis of price dispersion and 
spatial efficiency.   
While we would like to include such a measure for all observations in our sample, we 
were only able to obtain estimates for a small sub-sample of years.  Using data and methods ob-
tained from Cirera and Arndt (2008), we generate estimated transfer costs (meticals/kilo) for the 
markets in our sample.   
Estimating the basic specification using only a small sub-sample of years, however, re-
moves a significant portion of our data, and we find that we are unable to obtain any significant 
findings.  Table AD re-estimates Table 7 from above, where we augment the specification in 
Column 5 to include our transfer cost estimates. 
Looking at the results presented in Table D, we find that the coefficients on our cell 
phone dummy remains negative, however our point estimates are greatly reduced and we obtain 
no significant results—Columns 1, 2, 4, & 5, for instance, find an insignificant effect of treat-
ment within our limited sample.  Looking at Column 3, however, we find a significant positive 
coefficient on our estimated transfer costs (as expected) and a negative and significant effect of 
mobile phones. Given these results, we conclude that while we lose some degree of accuracy by 
omitting transfer costs from the results in Section III, we are likely to be underestimating the ac-
tual effect of cell coverage reported in the main body of this thesis, whereby the resulting bias, if 
anything, is likely to make our estimates more conservative. 
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Appendix D.  Estimated Impact of Cell Phone Rollout on Price Dispersion (Common Beans) ONLY FOR YEARS 
2001-2005      
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable (Priceit-Pricekt) 
No Time trend w/ 
Quarterly Dum-
mies 
OLS w/ Market-
Specific Fixed-
Effects 
OLS w/ Market-
Specific Fixed-
Effects & Est. 
Trans. Costs 
Fixed-Effects w/ 
Market-Pair 
Fixed-Effects 
Variable for one 
market covered 
      Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) -0.33 -0.33 -0.84** -0.38 -0.01 
 
0.42 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.73 
Est. Transfer Costs 
  
1.66586*** 
  
   
0.47964 
  Cell Phone Dummy (one covered) 
    
0.27695 
     
0.61105 
Drought Year Dummy 
 
1.42233 3.32*** 1.62554*** 1.53 
  
1.32192 0.67 0.5244 1.28 
Constant 6.94791*** 5.53*** 3.23*** 5.75*** 5.38*** 
 
1.06915 0.8 0.96 0.62 0.8 
Quarterly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market-Specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Sub-Sample Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts 
Observations 1999 1999 1707 1999 1999 
Adjusted R-squared 0.37 0.37 0.47 - 0.37 
Number of Groups - - - 65 - 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
     * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix E—Northern Markets 
 
 In line with the discussion above, we report the estimates from Tables 7-10 in the main 
body of the text using the northern markets sub-sample of our data.  As indicated,  not only are 
our point estimates close to zero in magnitude in most cases, but we find no significant effect of 
treatment.  These results enforce the discussion that follows our empirical results and indicates 
that additional factors—such as trade discontinuities, are likely at the heart of market inefficien-
cies in these regions. 
 
Table E1 (corresponds with Table 7 in the main text).  Estimated Impact of Cell Phone Rollout on Price Dispersion 
(Common Beans)--Average Treatment Effects 
     
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable (Priceit-Pricekt) 
No Time trend 
w/ Quarterly 
Dummies 
OLS w/ Market-
Specific Fixed-
Effects 
Fixed-Effects w/ 
Market-Pair 
Fixed-Effects 
Variable for one 
market covered 
 
    
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) 0.16 0.16 0 0.21 
 
0.74 0.74 0.78 1.03 
Cell Phone Dummy (one covered) 
   
0.05977 
    
0.51464 
Constant 5.36638*** 5.44*** 6.59*** 5.39*** 
 
0.64844 0.68 0.91 0.88 
Drought Year Dummy 
 
-0.07024 -1.96713*** -0.07 
  
0.56913 0.65001 0.57 
Quarterly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market-Specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes No Yes 
Sub-Sample Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts 
Observations 9083 9083 9083 9083 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 0.2 - 0.2 
Number of Groups - - 103 - 
Robust standard errors in italics 
    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable (Pi t-Pi j)
Basic 
Specification Time Dummies
Distance 
Dummies Market Sizes
Network Effects-
Teledensity
Network Effects-
Total # of Mrkts 
Covered
Coverage 
Density
Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) 0.16 0.22 2.88 -0.29 1.06
0.74 0.86 2.13 0.67 7.67
Cell Phone Dummy  * Shrt time. Dummy (<3 hrs) -0.70648
0.64663
Cell Phone Dummy  * Med time. Dummy (3-6 hrs) 0.04
0.78
Cell Phone Dummy  * Long time. Dummy (6-12 hrs) -0.13
0.67
Cell Phone Dummy  * Long Distance Dummy (500-1000km) -2.83752
1.97626
Coverage Density (25km radius) 4.42*
2.61
Cell Phone Dummy *ln(tot. mrkts covered) -0.33419
3.04432
Cell Phone Dummy *ln(teledensity) -0.71967*
0.40949
Cell*Mkt Size Dummy (both major) Omitted
--
Cell*Mkt Size Dummy (one major) -0.38308
0.9191
Cell*Mkt Size Dummy (both minor) 0.3
0.77
Cell Phone Dummy  * Med. Distance Dummy (150-500km) -2.73
2.07
Cell Phone Dummy  * Short Distance Dummy (<150km) Omitted
--
Constant 5.44*** 5.46*** 5.41*** 5.45*** 16.32*** 5.44*** 5.10***
0.68 0.67 0.67 0.67 1.9 0.68 0.55
Drought Year Dummy -0.07024 -0.08 -0.01 -0.06 0.36 -0.08 0.06912
0.56913 0.57 0.57 0.57 1.35 0.59 0.59648
Quarterly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Market-Specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sub-Sample Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts
Observations 9083 9083 9083 9083 6467 9083 9083
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Robust standard errors in italics
Table E2 (corresponds to Table 8 in the main text).  Effect of Cell Phone Rollout on Price Dispersion-Heterogeneous Effects 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table E3 ( Corresponds to Table 9 in the main text)—Effect of Cell Phone Rollout on Price Dispersion- Temporal Effects  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable (Priceit-Pricekt) 
Basic Specifi-
cation 
Temporal 
Effects-Cell 
Coverage over 
Time 
OLS w/ 
Lagged De-
pendent Vari-
able 
A-Bond Esti-
mator 
     Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) 0.16 0.43 0.04 -0.42 
 
0.74 2.25 0.43 0.71 
Cell Phone Dumm* quartly time trend 
 
-0.00448 
  
  
0.04124 
  Lagged Dependent Variable (1 period lag)-Common 
Beans 
  
0.46938*** 
 
   
0.02055 
 Constant 5.44*** 5.43*** 4.71*** 
 
 
0.68 0.66 0.73 
 Drought Year Dummy -0.07024 -0.07 -1.60* 2.13461 
 
0.56913 0.58 0.81 1.95084 
Quarterly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market-Specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-Sample 
Southern 
Mkts 
Southern 
Mkts 
Southern 
Mkts 
Southern 
Mkts 
Observations 9083 9083 7973 12468 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 0.2 0.39 - 
Number of Groups - - - 188 
Robust standard errors in italics 
    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table E4 (Corresponds to Table 10 in the main text)—Effect of Cell Phone Rollout on Price Dispersion-Additional Crops 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent Variable (Priceit-Pricekt) 
Common 
Beans 
Lrg. Ground-
nuts White Maize Rice Wheat Flour 
      Cell Phone Dummy (both covered) 0.16 -5.18 -0.01 0.63** -0.46* 
 
0.74 9.7 0.06 0.25 0.26 
Drought Year Dummy -0.07024 -1.20901 2.13961*** 0.20177 1.4779 
 
0.56913 4.91936 0.32241 0.23899 0.95152 
Constant 5.44*** 7.93 1.36*** 2.73*** 1.76* 
 
0.68 5.44 0.08 0.31 0.91 
Quarterly Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Market-Specific Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sub-Sample Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts Southern Mkts 
Observations 9083 5137 8226 9101 5211 
Adjusted R-squared 0.2 0.08 0.24 0.17 0.16 
Robust standard errors in italics 
   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Appendix F—Description of the Variables  
  
The following section outlines the primary variables used for estimation, as well as a dis-
cussion on their potential effects.   
Dependent Variable 
 In keeping with our motivation to evaluate market efficiency as determined by the “Law 
of One Price,” the dependent variable in this study is the absolute value of the price difference 
between markets i and k for a given time period (month) t: 
 
            |          |   for i ≠ k 
 
 Although several measures of price dispersion are used in the literature (for example, the 
min/max of prices across markets, the sample variance of prices across markets over time, and 
the Coefficient of Variation across markets in a given period), the use of the absolute difference 
in prices between market pairs is consistent with other studies that look at similar market types.  
Aker (2010), for instances, cites the large distances between markets in Niger as the motivation 
for using absolute price differences in her model, and given the similarity between the markets in 
her study and those in Mozambique, we find it appropriate to carry over this methodology.  
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Variables that Effect Spatial Price Dispersion  
 The following section outlines and defines a series of variables that are shown to effect 
spatial price dispersion among markets.  Inclusion of these variables in our models can be justi-
fied at the intuitive, theoretical, and empirical level, and are widely recognized by the literature 
as being significant explanators of spatial price dispersion:  
 
1) Transportation Costs—The “Law of One Price” states that in an efficient setting, identi-
cal goods will have the same price in all locations net of the transportation costs associat-
ed with arbitrage.   Given that this study is aimed at quantifying the role information 
plays in obtaining spatial efficiency, including accurate measures of transportation costs 
is paramount to creating viable estimates of our parameters of interest.  Unfortunately we 
are unable to obtain accurate data for all observations in our sample, and hence opt not to 
use such a variable in the main body of this thesis.  See Appendix D for more details. 
2) Drought year dummies—Since we are evaluating agricultural prices, it is important to 
consider explanators that might adversely impact the supply of crops.  Climatic variables 
are therefore necessary to capture the effects of these adverse shocks on crop output.   
Cell Phone Coverage Variables 
 The estimated impact of mobile telephony remains the primary parameter of interest for 
this empirical study.  Given this objective, there are several possible measurements of cell phone 
coverage that will be employed in the final models: 
1. Cell Phone Dummy, both markets covered (a.k.a bothcov)— a dummy variable equal to 1 
if both markets i and k have a cell tower present in time t, and 0 otherwise.   
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a. This is the primary variable of interest and directly measures the resulting change 
in price dispersion once cellular technology is made available to both markets in a 
pair (net of all the other included and relevant explanatory variables).  A priori, I 
expect the coefficient on bothcov to be negative and significant, as increased ac-
cess to market information as generated through cell phone use will enable arbi-
trage activity and shift markets towards a more integrated equilibrium. 
 
2. Cell Phone Coverage Dummy, one market covered (a.ka. onecov)—dummy variable 
equal to 1 if only one market in a market pair has a cell tower at time t.   
a. The interpretation of the magnitude and sign of this coefficient is open to specula-
tion, however overall I expect the coefficient to be insignificant.  Consider three 
markets: A, B, and C—at time t, markets A and B have a cell tower, but C does 
not (i.e. cellcovA,B = 1 and cellcovA,C = 0, onecovA,C = 1).  Imagine you are a trader 
in Market B, and you are considering arbitraging between your present location 
and Market A or C.  Standing in Market B, it stands to reason that you could use a 
cell phone to determine the price in Market A, but not in Market C.  Given the 
uncertainty, you might be tempted to refrain from interaction with Market C (with 
an unknown price) and instead trade with Market A (contingent, of course, on 
there being an attractive trade to be made).  Such a pattern would lead trade be-
tween markets pairs where onecov = 1 to diminish relative to where bothcov = 1, 
leading there to be an insignificant effect of cell phones on price dispersion.   
b. On the other hand, it could be the case that you have a contact who happened to 
pass through Market C yesterday, and is now within cell service and calls you to 
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report yesterday’s prices.  In this case, information is being transferred between 
markets (albeit slightly outdated) and there may in fact be some effect of cell 
phones on prices even if only one of the markets has a cell tower.  The likelihood 
of such an occurrence is certainly unknown, and without more insight into the 
workings of these markets it would be hard to presume beforehand.  In addition, 
the overall increased access to cell phones throughout the country might create 
trends in price behavior that come as a secondary effect of mobile phones—that is, 
perhaps the changes in price behavior that result from some market pairs being 
connected via cell phones (i.e. bothcov = 1) will spill over into market pairs that 
don’t have mobile coverage through other channels, such as by word of mouth.   
Intuitively, I suspect that the effects of onecov will be insignificant, however the 
discussion above presents the possibility that network effects and unobserved pat-
terns in information flows might be captured through the onecov variable. 
 
 
3. Coverage Density (25km radius)—the percentage of the area within 25km of a market 
that has cell phone coverage.  These figured are calculated on an annual basis as more 
and more towers were introduced throughout Mozambique.   
a. The dummy variables outlined above (onecov and bothcov) are beneficial to our 
analysis insofar as they proxy for whether information is available to traders to 
commit arbitrage between the various markets in our study.  However, the onecov 
and bothcov dummies only account for the presence of a cell tower within the 
physical market center, and do not account for whether mobile service is available 
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to famers who live outside a market area, but that nonetheless rely on these cen-
ters to sell their goods.  If we remain interested in how cell phones affect the eco-
nomic lives of the poor within these areas, this remains a relevant question.  Con-
sider, for example, the typical smallholder farmer who has relies on local markets 
to sell their goods.  Without access to market information, they must make their 
decisions on which market to attend at random or via historical information (i.e. a 
lagged dependent variable). However if they have cell service, then they have the 
ability to call several markets—or likewise several intermediaries—to determine 
the best price.  This coverage density variable is an attempt to capture this phe-
nomenon—using a “specified market area” of 25km, I expect to find that market 
areas with more cell coverage will have overall lower price dispersion—given 
that our underlying hypothesis is based on the notion that cell phones are lowering 
search costs (and consequently that farmers have multiple markets from which to 
plausibly choose), I expect that this variable will be especially relevant for mar-
kets that are closer together. 
 
4. teledensity—this is a macro-level variable that gives the total penetration rate for cell 
phones within Mozambique each year.  These data are measured as the “number of mo-
bile subscriptions per 100 in the population” and come from the International Telecom-
munications Database through the United Nations.  An important caveat in these figures 
is that they may inaccurately represent the “true” magnitude of teledensity.  First, because 
this figure reports subscriptions, it may inaccurately represent the number of users who 
obtain multiple accounts through the use of pre-paid cards.  Second, while it measures the 
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overall number of subscriptions, it doesn’t take into account shared-phones and the over-
all percentage of the population with access to mobile phone service. 
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Appendix G—Cross Section of Agricultural Prices 
 The following section attempts to provide some insight and context into the pricing be-
havior of agricultural goods in our study.  As the empirical results suggest, we find a relatively 
weak effect of mobile phones on price dispersion—the following charts and tables attempt to 
provide a “birds-eye” view of the agricultural markets in question, and affords us the opportunity 
to visualize the data behind the regression results.  Overall, we find that the price behavior of 
crops, at least upon visual inspection, remains relatively stable over time, and if anything, ap-
pears to increase in the later sections of our sample period. While these charts do not constitute 
rigorous analysis, they provide a helpful complement to the empirical sections above. 
Figure 9 demonstrates the overall price level (adjusted for inflation) for several key goods 
within the SIMA database. Overall, we observe that prices remain relatively stable across time 
with expected seasonal variation. 
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Figure 9. Average Crop Prices. Source SIMA 2011.
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We can further refine the this visual interpretation by considering price behavior not in 
terms of linear time, but rather by adjusting based relative time since a market pair receives a 
mobile phone.  Figure 10 displays the overall average prices for each market, where month “0” is 
interpreted as the first month a mobile tower was introduced.
12
 
 
 
Figure 10. Source: SIMA 2011 
 
Again, we find that the overall price level remains relatively consistent in the periods 
immediately before and after the introduction of cell phones, indicating little or no response to 
treatment. 
 
 
                                                     
12
 Note:  Because our data on cell tower construction is annual, we cannot determine the month in which a tower is 
built.  Consequently, we should take caution when we interpret graphs that compare monthly price data with annual 
treatment data.  For this reason, we include red rectangle seen in Figures 10 & 12.   
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We continue this line of analysis by turning to price dispersion rather that the overall lev-
el of prices: 
 
Figure 11. Source: SIMA 2011 
 
Figure 12. Source: SIMA 2011 
 Again, using simple visual inspection, we see little effect of mobile phone rollout on 
price dispersion. 
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